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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 60 JUNE 1962 No. 8 
CONGRESSIONAL REPAIR OF THE ERIE DERAILMENT 
Leonard V. Quigley* 
"We are to set the judges free." 
JUDGES sometimes make mistakes. Many such mistakes are rec-tified by appellate courts; many others are ignored or distin-
guished in subsequent cases and thus do not become accepted 
rules of law. But some mistakes are affirmed or made by courts 
of last resort and become, through application of the principle 
of stare decisis, governing rules of law which no court, including 
the court of last resort, will re-examine. To correct such judicially 
unassailable mistakes in the shortest possible time, appeal must 
be made to the legislature which, as a co-ordinate law-making in-
stitution, has the power and duty to review and revise judge-made 
law.1 The necessity-and the limited function--of such legisla-
tive action was outlined by Judge Cardozo in his plea for a "Min-
istry of Justice" to back-stop the New York courts: 
"Thus, again and again, the processes of judge-made law 
bring judges to a stand that they would be glad to abandon 
if an outlet could be gained. It is too late to retrace their 
steps. At all events, whether really too late or not, so many 
judges think it is that the result is the same as if it were .... 
There is need of a fresh start; and nothing short of a statute, 
unless it be the erosive work of years, will supply the missing 
energy. . . . Legislation is needed, not to repress the forces 
through which judge-made law develops, but to stimulate 
and free them. Often a dozen lines or less will be enough 
for our deliverance. The rule that is to emancipate is not 
to imprison in particulars. It is to speak the language of 
general principles, which, once declared, will be developed 
• Member of the New York Bar.-Ed. 
1 See generally HART &: SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
AND .APl'LICATION OF LAW 415, 476-78, 599, 722-23 (Tent. ed. 1957). 
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and expanded as analogy and custom and utility and justice, 
when weighed by judges in the balance, may prescribe the 
mode of application and the limits of extension. The judicial 
process is to be set in motion again, but with a new point 
of departure, a new impetus and direction. In breaking one 
set of shackles, we are not to substitute another. We are to 
set the judges free."2 
It is the thesis of this article that such legislative review and 
repair is required today on the part of the federal legislature in 
regard to the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. Such 
reconsideration is particularly appropriate where, as in the anal-
ogous commerce clause area, the subject matter has been com-
mitted specifically to the Congress by the Constitution.3 
The Supreme Court stumbled badly in subjecting the diver-
sity jurisdiction to the "outcome determinative" principle-a 
principle required neither by the Constitution nor by the holding 
of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.4 The principle of the Erie case 
requires a federal judge sitting in a diversity jurisdiction case to 
differentiate between the applicable substantive law-which the 
Constitution requires to be state law-and the applicable proce-
dural law-which is federal. Distinguishing between "substance" 
and "procedure" is a hard, sophisticated task which the Court 
tried to escape by adopting the mechanical "outcome determina-
tive" test, a test which is not only non-responsive to the problem 
but logically leads to the obliteration of the role of the federal 
judiciary and the inapplicability of all federal procedural rules in 
diversity litigation. 
The continued refusal of the Court to re-examine this mistake 
has created a situation which calls for corrective legislation by 
the Congress-either to abolish the diversity jurisdiction in its 
present form or to retain it and repair the damage done. Since 
the diversity jurisdiction continues to fulfill a vital role in the 
United States federal system, it should be retained and repaired. 
2 Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 113, 115-1'7 (1921). The suggested 
"Ministry of Justice" became the New York Law Revision Commission, created by the 
N.Y. LEGIS, LAw §§ '70-72. For a review of the work of the Commission, see the sympo-
sium, The Commission and the Courts, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 641 (1955). 
8 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9, cl. 18; art. III, § 1. Compare the impact of the legis-
lative action of Congress under the commerce clause, art. I, § 8, cl. 3, as reflected by 
Pennsylvania v. "Wheeling &: Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852) and 
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &: Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855). 
4 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
1962] THE ERIE DERAILMENT 1033 
J. PRESENT STATUS OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 
Under the reign of Swift v. Tyson,5 the federal courts were 
under the heavy burden of developing a "federal common law." 
Since its deserved demise in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, the role of the 
federal judge in diversity litigation has worsened drastically, until 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter could recently cite a judgment in which 
he concurred "as further proof of the mounting mischief inflicted 
on the federal judicial system by the unjustifiable continuance of 
diversity jurisdiction."6 What has happened in the intervening 
years to bring this about has been an extension of Erie from a 
constitutional requirement that state substantive law control in 
diversity cases to a principle of uniformity of outcome of litigation 
within the borders of a state. Mr. Justice Frankfurter himself 
wrote the opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,7 the case that 
made this logical leap, summarizing the principle in an oft-quoted 
sentence: 
"The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of 
a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of 
in a State court a block away should not lead to a substan-
tially different result."8 
Whatever the origin and justification for this uniformity prin-
ciple, it has led the Court to hold that federal courts sitting in 
diversity jurisdiction cases must do what the state courts would 
do as to choice of law,9 burden of proof,1° limitation of actions,11 
availability of remedy, 12 commencement of suit13 and qualification 
5 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
6 Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954). The Court upheld 
the Louisiana Direct Action Statute which in effect created diversity jurisdiction when-
ever one party to a local tort had a foreign insurance company, thereby giving the 
plaintiff a jury he could not get in the local state courts. 
7 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
a Id. at 109. The preceding sentence contained a potentially narrower standard of 
similarity of outcome: "so far as legal rules determine the outcome of litigation. • .• " 
o Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), approving Sampson v. 
Channell, ll0 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. den., 310 U.S. 650 (1940), and Waggaman v. 
General Fin. Co., ll6 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1941). 
10 Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 
208 (1939). 
11 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
12 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Angel v. Bullington, 
330 U.S. 183 (1947). 
13 Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &: Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
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to bring suit14 notwithstanding litigants' reliance on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.15 Thus the only difference remaining 
between suit in a state and in a federal court is that the federal 
suit will probably be judged by a local judge selected for life 
instead of a local judge elected for a term and will be governed 
by a uniform set of procedural rules, whose validity and applica-
tion will diminish in direct proportion to their effect upon the 
outcome of the litigation. 
In addition, while the role of the federal judge in diversity 
cases has been diminishing, the actual amount of such litigation 
has been increasing at a prodigious rate. From 1941 to 1956 the 
number of such cases filed per year increased 180 percent16 and in 
1956 alone the number of private diversity cases in the federal 
courts outnumbered the private federal question cases by three to 
one.17 
While this situation might be tolerated if the load of litiga-
tion were being shared by federal and state courts equally com-
petent to find and apply state law, this is not the case. For it is 
in this area of ascertaining what is the substantive law of the state 
that the federal -judges are not even the equal of the state judges. 
Judge Charles Clark has called it "the most troublesome, the most 
unsatisfying in its consequences, of all the rules based upon the 
Tompkins case" that the federal courts "must act as a hollow 
sounding board, wooden indeed, for any state judge who cares 
to express himself."18 
For, while Erie seemed to leave the federal trial judges free 
to determine for themselves the governing rule of state law, the 
Court two years later held that the district judges were bound 
to follow a decision of a lower state court of general jurisdiction 
"in the absence of more convincing evidence of what the state 
law is."19 This was so, even though the inferior state court's 
14 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Woods v. Inter• 
state Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). 
15 Ragan v. Merchants Transfer&: Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (rule 3); Cohen 
v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., supra note 14 (rule 23); Woods v. Interstate Realty 
Co., supra note 14 (rule 17(b)). 
10 S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1958). 
17 Id. at 13. 
18 Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. 
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 290-91 (1946). 
19 Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 178 (1940). Four other cases 
decided at the same term brought the message home to the lower federal courts: Van-
denbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1940); Stoner v. New York Life Ins. 
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decision was unsound, for whether the state's highest court would 
follow it was "merely a matter of conjecture."20 
Thus the federal courts, far from being able to harmonize the 
state law and develop it by co-operative judicial craftsmanship 
side-by-side with the state courts, must take a second seat to the 
state courts and search only their holdings and dicta for their 
grounds of decision. That this is second-rate justice with avenge-
ance is illustrated in Pomerantz v. Clark21 in which Judge Wy-
zanski denied relief to a plaintiff though the state courts had not 
spoken on the issue and a contrary result seemed to be a logical 
development of the law: 
"[T]he never-to-be-forgotten caution is that this Court is 
not free to render such decision as seems to it equitable, just 
and in accordance with public policy and responsive to all 
the jurisprudential criteria which so often enter into what 
Justice Cardozo called 'The Nature of the Judicial Process.' 
A federal judge sitting in a diversity jurisdiction case has not 
a roving commission to do justice or to develop the law ac-
cording to his, or what he believes to be the sounder, views . 
. . . His task is to divine the views of the state court judges."22 
And there is an echo of Brandeis' Erie rationale in a recent dis-
senting opinion of Judge Clark: 
"We are pressing the Erie doctrine to a dry and wooden 
extreme where citizens of other states, unlike the home folk, 
must submit to having their rights settled or lost by dead, 
and not 'living' law."23 
Although this disabling of the federal judiciary does not rise to 
the level of deprivation of due process or right to a fair_ trial,24 
Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940); West v. American Tel. 8e Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Six 
Cos. v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180 (1940). 
20 Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, supra note 19, at 179. Eight years later the Court 
stopped short of carrying this rule to its logical extreme in King v. Order of United 
Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153 (1948), unanimously affirming the refusal of a federal 
court to follow the unreported decision of a state court of limited territorial jurisdiction 
which would not be binding on any state court, including the court which handed down.. 
the decision. 
21 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951), noted critically in 100 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1065 (1952). 
22 Pomerantz v. Clark, supra note 21, at 345. The issue was the creation of an 
exception to the Massachusetts rule barring shareholder derivative suits unless the plain-
tiff first presented his case to the shareholders. 
23 Alford v. Noonan, 259 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 1958). 
24 But see Clark, supra note 18, at 291. 
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it does give the litigants a far less vital brand of justice than 
would be available in the state court.25 A litigant seeking to upset 
an unsound state precedent must avoid the federal court at all 
costs, and the specter of the much-feared evil of forum-shopping 
again raises its head.26 
Not only are the litigants disadvantaged by such a narrow 
view of the role of the federal courts in diversity litigation, but 
the states themselves are deprived of any assistance from the fed-
eral judiciary. The number of available minds working at solu-
tions to difficult problems is materially reduced. Professor Hart 
has said: 
"The healthy development of law is paralyzed without 
the creative participation of courts. If federal courts, in the 
exposition of state law, are not to have the freedom at least 
of the state courts immediately inferior to the state's highest 
court, federal justice in such matters is doomed to be second-
rate justice, and the state systems will lose the benefit of 
valuable contributions to their growth."27 
Taking as our basic datum this burdensome brand of second-
rate justice, let us assay the adequacy of recent judicial and legis-
lative attempts to correct the situation. 
II. ATTEMPTED REMEDIES: JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE 
In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op.,28 the Court an-
nounced a new approach to diversity jurisdiction that was at once 
both encouraging and dissatisfying-a surprising drawing-back 
25 See, e.g., Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, 
J.): "After prolonged cerebration, our prophetic judgment is that decision in that court 
would be for the plaintiff." In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 
(1956), the Court reemphasized, at 204, the search for what the local judges would do, 
with no hint of any creative action by the federal court. 
26 See Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 774.75 (1941): 
"Therefore, when the forum is a federal court, that court must determine the applicable 
law by recourse to all the juristic data that are available to the state court. If the 
federal judge is required to disregard some of those available data, the litigant is not 
getting the same justice he would get if the forum were a court of the state whose 
system of law is applicable; his rights, by reason of this limitation, will vary with the 
forum and will again depend upon the accident of diversity of citizenship. • • • 
"When the rights of a litigant are dependent on the law of a particular state, the 
court of the forum must do its best (not its worst) to determine what that law is. It 
must use its judicial brains, not a pair of scissors and a paste pot," 
27 Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 GoLUM. L. REv. 489, 510 
(1954). 
28 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
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from a pure "outcome determinative" test to a new two-step test. 
This was a diversity suit by a North Carolina resident against a 
South Carolina corporation for injury allegedly negligently in-
flicted while plaintiff was an employee of a contractor doing work 
for the defendant in South Carolina. The defendant raised the 
affirmative defense that the South Carolina Workmen's Compen-
sation Act29 barred the plaintiff from suing at law and remitted 
him to his exclusive remedy of benefits under the statute. The 
district court held the statute did not apply to plaintiff, struck 
the defense, and sent the case to a jury, which found for the plain-
tiff. The Fourth Circuit held the district court's reading of the 
statute erroneous, but did not order a new trial. Instead, it made 
its own determination on the record that plaintiff was within the 
statute and directed judgment for the defendant.30 On appeal, 
the Supreme Court held this latter disposition to be error. Speak-
ing for a majority of six, Mr. Justice Brennan agreed with the 
Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the statute, but held that plain-
tiff was entitled to try the issue of the applicability of the statute to 
him under that interpretation, inasmuch as the striking of the 
defense below deprived him of any reason to do so before. 
The Court also considered the question whether on remand 
the factual issue upon which the application of the statute turned 
should be decided by the judge or by the jury. The defendant 
argued that the federal courts are bound under Erie to follow the 
state practice that the issue is for the judge alone, in order to 
secure uniform enforcement of the immunity created by the state. 
In resolving the question, the Court first looked to the state rule 
to determine whether it is "bound up with these rights and obli-
gations in such a way that its application in the federal court is 
required."31 Finding that the rule grew up in cases reviewing the 
orders of the state Industrial Commission and reflected merely a 
desire for judicial control of jurisdictional facts, the Court con-
cluded: 
"We find nothing to suggest that this rule was announced 
as an integral part of the special relationship created by the 
statute. Thus the requirement appears to be merely a form 
:.?9 S.C. CODE §§ 72-111 {1952) extended the application of the act to workmen of 
subcontractors without defining that term. 
30 238 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1956). 
31 356 U.S. at 535. 
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and mode of enforcing the immunity, Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
York, 326 U.S. 99, 108, and not a rule intended to be bound 
up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the 
parties."32 
But the Court did not feel free to stop there. Even though 
the state practice was not an "integral part" of the local law, 
". . . cases following Erie have evinced a broader policy to 
the effect that the federal courts should conform as near as 
may be-in the absence of other considerations-to state rules 
even of form and mode where the state rules may bear sub-
stantially on the question whether the litigation would come 
out one way in the federal court and another way in the state 
court if the federal court failed to apply a particular local 
rule. E.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra; Bernhardt v. 
Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198."33 
Assuming that in the instant tort case the outcome would be 
substantially affected by whether the factual issue upon which the 
application of the state statute turned were tried by the judge or 
by the jury, the Court admitted a strong case could be made out 
for following the state practice, "were 'outcome' the only con-
sideration. "34 
It was at this point that the Court reversed the trend of post-
Erie cases and started the countermarch toward a solution more 
rational than the pure "outcome" test: 
"But there are affirmative countervailing considerations at 
work here. The federal system is an independent system for 
administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its 
jurisdiction. An essential characteristic of that system is the 
manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes 
trial functions between judge and jury and, under the influ-
ence-if not the command--of the Seventh Amendment, as-
32 356 U.S. at 536. Tlie Court, on this basis, felt justified in distinguishing the con• 
verse situation, Dice v. Akron C. &: Y.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952), where it held the right 
to jury trial was so substantial a part of the FELA cause of action that it pre-
vailed in an Ohio state court over the local practice of sending the issue of fraudulent 
release to the judge alone. 
33 356 U.S. at 536·37. The Court's phrase bears a nostalgic similarity to the long-
repealed Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196: "the practice, pleadings, 
and forms and modes of proceeding in other than equity and admiralty causes in the 
circuit and district courts of the United States shall conform, as near as may be, to the 
practice .•• existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the state. • • ," 
34 356 U.S. at 537. 
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signs the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury . 
. . . The policy of uniform enforcement of state-created rights 
and obligations, see, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, 
cannot in every case exact compliance with a state rule-not 
bound up with rights and obligations-which disrupts the 
federal system of allocating functions between judge and jury. 
Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U.S. 91. Thus the in-
quiry here is whether the federal policy of favoring jury de-
cisions of disputed fact questions should yield to the state 
rule in the interest of furthering the objective that the litiga-
tion should not come out one way in the federal court and 
another way in the state court."35 
Having posed the issue in this way, the Court held that the 
strong federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the 
judge-jury relationship in the federal courts should prevail "in 
the circumstances of this case." The Court bolstered this position 
with a cite to Herron' s fighting words: "state laws cannot alter the 
essential character or function of a federal court."36 Since the 
Fourth Circuit had not considered all the defendant's grounds of 
appeal, the case was remanded to it to pass upon the other grounds 
and, if not rendered unnecessary by their disposition, to remand 
to the district court for a new trial of such issues as the court of 
appeals should direct.37 
35 Ibid. 
36 356 U.S. at 539. Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931), held that a 
federal trial court could direct a verdict on the issue of contributory negligence in the 
teeth of a provision in the Arizona Constitution that the issue must go to the jury. 
Having thus disposed of the case on the assumption that following the state practice 
would "substantially affect" the outcome, the Court felt obliged to fall back a bit by 
denying the assumption: "But clearly there is not present here the certainty that a 
different result would follow, cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, or even the strong 
possibility that this would be the case, cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., supra . •.• We 
do not think the likelihood of a different result is so strong as to require the federal 
practice of jury determination of disputed factual issues to yield to the state rule in 
the interest of uniformity of outcome." 356 U.S. at 539--40. 
37 356 U.S. at 540. That York is not at all a logical corollary of Erie but a new 
principle based on independent policies is something the Court never seems to have 
questioned. Concurring as to the remand for new trial but dissenting as to the Erie 
issue, Mr. Justice "Whittaker revealed, at 548, in two sentences in his argument, the 
logical gap between Erie and York: "The Federal District Court, in this diversity case, 
is bound to follow the substantive South Carolina law that would be applied if the 
trial were to be held in a South Carolina court, in which State the Federal District 
Court sits. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64. A Federal District Court sitting in 
South Carolina may not legally reach a substantially different result than would have 
been reached upon a trial of the same case 'in a state court a block away.' Guaranty 
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109.'' 
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The encouraging point about the Byrd case is that a majority 
of the Justices could be found willing to go beyond the mechan-
ical "outcome" test to the more difficult task of finding some com-
promise position that gives full sway to the state substantive law 
without disembowelling the federal court system. It has been 
suggested38 that the Court has, in effect, adopted the policy-
weighing approach urged by Mr. Justice Rutledge in his dissent 
in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Co.39 
The discouraging point about the case, as far as further prog-
ress is concerned, is that it accepts as starting points for discussion 
the Erie progeny-particularly York and Bernhardt-that should 
themselves be re-evaluated. One might have hoped that the Court, 
in abandoning a mechanical approach, would return to the more 
difficult, but equally more judge-like, task of drawing the line 
between substance and procedure.40 Instead, the Court has stopped 
mid-way, creating a new test that may be even more difficult for 
the lower courts to apply. 
That the Court felt the need of a second part to the test at 
all is in itself disheartening. One would have thought that when 
the Court found that the state rule was not a rule "intended to 
be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of 
the parties," that that would have been the end of it. But instead 
of continuing with this approach through to the end, the Court 
abandoned it to return to the highly questionable practice of 
looking backward from result to origin, from "substantially affect" 
to "substantive." The Court's fondness for this approach seems 
38 Comment, 72 HARv. L. REv. 77, 148-49 (1958). 
39 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Dissenting in this and two other cases decided the same day, 
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer&: Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) and Woods v. Inter-
state Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), Mr. Justice Rutledge feared impairment of con-
gressional power: "It is the gloss which has been put upon the Erie ruling by later 
decisions, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, which in my opinion is being 
applied to extend the Erie ruling far beyond its original purpose or intent and, in my 
judgment, with consequences and implications seriously impairing Congress' power, 
within its proper sphere of action, to control this type of litigation in the federal 
courts. . .• For, as the matter stands, it is Congress which has the power to govern 
the procedure of the federal courts in diversity cases, and the states which have the 
power over matters clearly substantive in nature ..•. The real question is not whether 
the separation shall be made, but how . . .; whether mechanically by reference to 
whether the states courts' doors are open or closed, or by a consideration of the policies 
which close them and their relation to accommodating the policy of the Erie rule 
with Congress' power to govern the incidents of litigation in diversity suits." 337 U.S. 
at 558-59. 
40 See HART &: WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 659-60 (1953) 
[hereinafter cited HART &: WECHSLER]. 
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too deeply embedded to be eradicated by anything short of con-
gressional legislation. 
A further reason why the Byrd case alone cannot be relied 
upon for a comprehensive judicial correction of the ills of diver-
sity litigation is the fact that the case concerned the right to jury 
trial in the federal courts.41 Despite all protestations to the con-
trary,42 the concurrence of six Justices in the majority may be 
explained only by the existence of the seventh amendment. At 
any rate, whether or not the case is essentially a seventh amend-
ment case, that handle exists for all to distinguish it readily in 
any future litigation where it might be hoped to be of some 
vitality as precedent. 
The best effort of the Court, therefore, is unsatisfactory as a 
comprehensive solution and too shaky a reed to rely upon in its 
own domain. Has the Congress done any better? 
Congressional response to the mounting problem of diversity 
litigation has so far taken the form of limiting the jurisdiction, 
not repairing it. This emphasis on quantity instead of quality is 
the dominant characteristic of the 1958 amendments to the judi-
cial code,43 the first congressional attempt to re-shape the fed-
eral jurisdiction in decades.44 
In an attempt to keep abreast of the inflation of the dollar, 
the jurisdictional amount in general federal question and diver-
sity cases was raised from 3,000 to 10,000 dollars, in both original 
and removal cases.45 To discourage proportionate inflation of 
41 U.S. CoNsr., amend. VII: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than 
according to the rules of the common law." 
42 In a footnote to the Byrd opinion, the Court denied expressly that the case was 
controlled by the amendment: "Our conclusion makes unnecessary the consideration of-
and we intimate no view upon-the constitutional question whether the right of jury 
trial protected in federal courts by the Seventh Amendment embraces the factual issue 
of statutory immunity when asserted, as here, as an affirmative defense in a common-
law negligence action." 356 U.S. 537 n.10. It has been suggested that when even an 
"integral" state policy directly conflicts with the amendment, the federal interest rep-
resented therein will outweigh all considerations in favor of applying the state practice 
in federal courts. 72 HARV. L. R.Ev. 77, 149 (1958). 
43 72 Stat. 415 (1958), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32, 1445 (1958). The legislative history is 
contained in S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. 
No. 18!10]; 104 CONG. R.Ec. 12683-90 (1958) [hereinafter cited as 104 CoNG. REc.]; Hear-
ing Be/ ore Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judidary, 85th Cong., 
1st Scss., Ser. 5 (1957) [hereinafter cited as 1957 Hearings]. 
44 For a list of the various unsuccessful prior bills, see the Report of the Committee 
on Jurisdiction and Venue, S. REP. No. 1830, at 17. 
45 28 u.s.c. §§ 1331-32 (1958). 
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claims to meet the new requirement, the court is given discretion, 
in cases where the plaintiff ultimately recovers less than 10,000 
dollars, to deny him costs and, in addition, to impose costs upon 
him.46 The most significant change is a provision that, for pur-
poses of diversity jurisdiction, corporations are "deemed" citizens 
not only of any state in which they are incorporated but also of 
the state in which they maintain their principal place of business:n 
A final amendment forbids removal of cases arising under state 
workmen's compensation acts.48 
The complete absence of any provision for correcting or reg-
ulating the manner and mode of exercising the jurisdiction may 
be explained by the way in which the issue was posed-amend-
ments to the jurisdictional grant sections of the judicial code:'0 
In this posture, the only issues really debated were the Congress' 
constitutional power to treat corporations as citizens of their state 
of principal place of business,50 and the desirability of going be-
yond such a minor limitation of jurisdiction to a total abolition 
of diversity jurisdiction.51 The former was resolved in favor of 
congressional power without much opposition,52 and the latter was 
resolved by following the recommendations of the Judicial Con-
ference's Committee of Jurisdiction and Venue.53 
The legislative hearings indicate an awareness of the growing 
bulk of diversity cases, 54 and the ineffectiveness of the mere nu-
merical increase of federal judges.55 Statistics presented indicated 
that the new provisions would have excluded about 20 percent, 
or 645 of the 3,186 diversity cases filed in the second quarter of 
1957.56 But, since the majority of diversity cases sound in tort, 
the plaintiff's claim can be easily increased to meet the new juris-
dictional requirement, and the provision for imposition of costs 
46 Ibid. 
47 28 u.s.c. § 1332 (1958). 
48 28 u.s.c. § 1445 (1958). 
49 See Note, Congressional Patchwork in Federal Jurisdiction, 6 UTAH L. REY. 231 
(1958); Note, 72 HARv. L. R.Ev. 391 (1958). 
50 See 104 CONG. R.Ec., at 12686, 1957 Hearings, at 28. 
51 See S. REP. No. 1830, at 15-32, 53-54, 1957 Hearings, at 9-27. 
52 Representative Celler, during the House debate, introduced into the record a 
memo on "Power of Congress To Restrict Corporations Under Diversity of Citizenship 
by Declaring Them Citizens of States Where They Have Their Principal Place of Busi-
ness." 104 CoNG. R.Ec. 12686. 
53 S. REP. No. 1830, at 24. 
54 104 CONG. R.Ec. 12683; s. REP. No. 1830, at 11-13. 
55 S. REP. No. 1830, at 16. 
56 S. REP. No. 1830, at 15. 
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appears to constitute no effective deterrent. Not only is it slight 
punishment in itself, but the reluctance of federal judges to invoke 
such a penalty may be expected to render the provision of little 
practical effect. 
Hence the long-awaited congressional legislation in the diver-
sity area has resulted only in a limitation of the amount of such 
litigation and, in all probability, a minor one at that. The really 
serious ills of the administration of the jurisdiction retained, 
whatever its amount, still await legislative consideration and cor-
rection. 
Ill. THE POSSIBILITY OF ABOLISHING DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 
Congress thus remains at the crossroads. It may either pro-
ceed to regulate and improve the manner of adjudicating diver-
sity cases or decide to abolish the diversity jurisdiction entirely. 
If Congress believes that the present "uniformity of outcome 
within a state" principle is either constitutionally required or 
federally desirable, then it should legislate to abolish the diversity 
jurisdiction. The Brief for the Proponents on this issue has al-
ready been eloquently written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the 
leading architect of the "outcome" principle.57 Concurring in a 
recent decision upholding a state statute aimed at manipulating 
the diversity jurisdiction, the Justice demanded that Congress 
abolish the jurisdiction: 
"But our holding results in such a glaring perversion of the 
purpose to which the original grant of diversity jurisdiction 
was directed that it ought not to go without comment, as 
further proof of the mounting mischief inflicted on the fed-
eral judicial system by the unjustifiable continuance of di-
versity jurisdiction."58 
Pointing out that diversity jurisdiction had only tepid support 
from the founding fathers, has always been subjected to abuse 
and, consequently, has often been the subject of controversy and 
157 See the opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), and Angel 
v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), and the dissent in First Nat'! Bank v. United Air 
Lines, 342 U.S. 396, 401 (1952). 
58 Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 347 U.S. 48, 53-54 (1954). See also his 
dissents in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) and 
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336 (1943). 
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opposition, Frankfurter chronicled the abortive congressional bills 
to curb the jurisdiction, concluding: 
"Legislative attempts at correction have thus far failed. But 
by overruling the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, despite its cen-
tury-old credentials, this Court uprooted the most noxious 
weeds that had grown around diversity jurisdiction. What 
with the increasing permeation of national feeling and the 
mobility of modern life, little excuse is left for diversity 
jurisdiction, now that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64, has put a stop to the unwarranted freedom of federal 
courts to fashion rules of local law in defiance of local law."00 
Since he believes the federal diversity jurisdiction to be in-
herently "not founded in reason,"60 Mr. Justice Frankfurter is 
not surprised that it has been subjected to abuses in the past and 
will be subject to new abuses in the future. But he is not so much 
disturbed by discriminatory advantages to litigants as by "an issue 
that cuts deeper than the natural selfishness of litigants to exploit 
the law's weaknesses. My concern is with the bearing of diversity 
jurisdiction on the effective functioning of the federal judiciary."61 
For it is in the sheer bulk of diversity cases that Frankfurter sees 
the greatest evil of the retention of the jurisdiction. The increase 
in business of the federal courts cannot be met by an increase in 
the number of federal judges; for, since the business of courts is 
"drastically unlike the business of factories," a steady increase in 
judges will result "in a depreciation of the judicial currency and 
the consequent impairment of the prestige and of the efficacy of 
the federal courts."62 Having thus posed the issue as one of dan-
ger to the whole federal judiciary, Mr. Justice Frankfurter con-
cludes with some sharp questions directed to Congress: 
"Madison believed that Congress would return to the state 
courts judicial power entrusted to the federal courts 'when 
they find the tribunals of the states established on a good foot-
ing.' 3 Elliot's Debates 536 (1891). Can it fairly be said that 
state tribunals are not now established on a sufficiently 'good 
footing' to adjudicate state litigation that arises between citi-
zens of different States, including the artificial corporate citi-
59 Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, supra note 58, at 56. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Id. at 57. 
62 Id. at 59. 
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zens, when they are the only resort for the much larger vol-
ume of the same type of litigation between their own citizens? 
Can the state tribunals not yet be trusted to mete out justice 
to non-resident litigants; should resident litigants not be com-
pelled to trust their own state tribunals? In any event, is it 
sound public policy to withdraw from the incentives and en-
ergies for reforming state tribunals, where such reform is 
needed, the interests of influential groups who through diver-
sity litigation are now enabled to avoid state courts?"63 
There seems little doubt as to the power of Congress to elimi-
nate diversity jurisdiction.64 Whether or not the power should be 
exercised, however, has been the subject of prolonged debate. 
During the period from 1928 to 1933, the law journals bristled 
with arguments pro and con65 and the Senate Judiciary Committee 
under Senator Norris twice-in 1930 and 1932-reported out bills 
to eliminate diversity jurisdiction.68 
Whatever the merits of the debate over Senator Norris' bill, 
times have changed drastically since 1932. Erie has ended the hopes 
63 Id. at 59-60. 
64 Congressional control over the jurisdiction of federal courts was upheld in: Lau£ 
v. E. G. Shinner &: Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938); Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 
509 (1916); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 
(3 How.) 236, 245 (1845); McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504, 506 (1813); Turner 
v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 9 (1799). Congress' power was summarized 
in an oft-quoted passage from Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922): 
"Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the Constitution. 
Every other court created by the general government derives its jurisdiction wholly from 
the authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction 
at its discretion, provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the 
Constitution. • • • The Constitution simply gives to the inferior courts the capacity 
to take jurisdiction in the enumerated cases, but it requires an act of Congress to confer 
it. The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252. And the jurisdiction having been conferred 
may, at the will of Congress, be taken away in whole or in part; and if withdrawn 
without a saving clause all pending cases though cognizable when commenced must fall. 
The Assessor v. Osbornes, 9 Wall. 567, 575." 
65 In chronological order, see Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between 
United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928); Yntema &: Jaffin, Preliminary 
Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 869 (1931); Frankfurter, A Note 
on Diversity Jurisdiction in Reply to Professor Yntema, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (1931); 
Howland, Shall Federal Jurisdiction of Controversies Between Citizens of Different 
States Be Preserved?, 18 A.B.A.J. 499 (1932); Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent 
Attacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A.J. 433 (1932); Clark, Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction of 
the Federal Courts, 19 A.B.A.J. 499 (1933); Yntema, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts 
in Controversies Between Citizens of Different States, 19 A.B.A.J. 71, 149, 265 (1933); 
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483 (1928); 
Ball, Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 28 ILL. L. REv. 356 (1933). 
66 See S. REP. No. 530, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); S. REP. No. 691, 71st Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1930). 
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for using diversity jurisdiction to develop a uniform nation-wide 
body of substantive law which the United States citizen could in-
voke throughout the country. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. 
Co.,67 has deprived the federal courts of the power to develop a 
body of conflict of laws principles applicable to interstate disputes. 
York, Bernhardt and Angel v. Bullington68 close the doors of the 
federal courts whenever the doors of the state courts are closed, 
thwarting any use of the federal courts to pursue a litigant into a 
"haven" state. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.69 
threatens to invalidate all the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field70 bars the federal judges from 
using their own minds to assist in the development of the law they 
are applying. 
It was this last factor that moved Professor Wechsler in 1948 
to urge the revisers of the judicial code to eliminate the jurisdic-
tion: 
"What is needed is a total reconsideration of the jurisdiction, 
guided by the principle that federal judicial energy should 
be preserved for vindication of these interests which, because 
the Congress has considered them of national importance, 
have become the subject of the federal substantive law. 
Within that sphere and that alone, federal courts can function 
as creative agents, the authorized interpreters of Constitution, 
treaty, and statute, the acknowledged sources of that subordi-
nate and interstitial legislation which must come in any sys-
tem from the courts. In many ways the worst part of the 
diversity jurisdiction is that it debases the judicial process, 
reducing federal judges to what Judge Frank has called 'ven-
triloquist's dummy to the courts of some particular state'-
because they lack the requisite authority to speak themselves. 
Erie v. Tompkins was a necessary corrective of an act of 
usurpation, but the federal system will be at its best when 
federal courts concern themselves primarily with federal 
law and there is smallest room within the range of their 
adjudication for the Erie doctrine to apply."71 
In view of the restricted role of the federal judiciary in diver-
01 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
68 330 U.S. 183 (1947). 
69 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
70 311 U.S. 169 (1940). 
71 Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw &: 
CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 238 (1948). 
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sity litigation, there seems no justification for continuing to sup-
port the jurisdiction merely because of the "superior quality" of 
the federal judges. The supporters of the jurisdiction must fall back 
upon the arguments based on bias and the advantages of minor 
federal housekeeping rules. But blatant bias is a federal question, 
and federal jurisdiction can be appropriately invoked in such 
cases. 72 And so it is only the subtle bias, the hypothecated in-
grained willingness to do injustice to an out-of-stater, that the 
diversity jurisdiction protects against. Into the scales of practical 
politics, then, must go, on the one side, protection against such 
subtle bias and the advantages of federal housekeeping rules 
harmless enough to pass Ragan, and, on the other, the enormous 
cost in dollars and man-hours of retaining the jurisdiction, the 
impairment of the handling of federal question litigation, the 
threat to the quality of the federal judiciary by constantly in-
creasing its numbers, and the escape through the federal steam 
valve of the local pressure that should be brought to bear upon 
the inadequacies of state courts. Reasonable men may differ as to 
how the scales tip, but to this observer they point decidedly in 
favor of abolishing the current brand of diversity jurisdiction.73 
IV. RETENTION AND CORRECTION OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 
Abolition is recommended upon the assumption that the 
present status of the diversity jurisdiction is either constitutionally 
required or federally desirable. If, however, diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction does have a contemporary utility, which requires a 
different status, then the jurisdiction should be retained, and 
Congress should legislate to provide a suitable federal tribunal 
for the implementation of the purposes of the jurisdiction. 
A. The Continuing Function of Diversity Jurisdiction 
The mandatory and permissible characteristics of the diversity 
jurisdiction depend in the last instance on the function which the 
jurisdiction is conceived to fulfill. Hamilton stated it in The 
Federalist: 
"It may be esteemed the basis of the union, that 'the 
72 New York Central R.R. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 314, 319 (1929). 
73 A recent article carrying the banner for abolition is Kurland, The Distribution 
of Judicial Power Between National and State Courts, 42 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 159 (1959). 
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citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the several states.' And if it be 
a just principle, that every government ought to possess the 
means of executing its own provisions, by its own authority, 
it will follow, that in order to the inviolable maintenance of 
that equality of privileges and immunities to which the citi-
zens of the union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought 
to preside in all cases, in which one state or its citizens are 
opposed to another state or its citizens."74 
On the assumption that Hamilton meant only negative protec-
tion against deprivation of justice, Friendly labelled this argu-
ment "specious" and questioned the "sincerity" of Marshall's 
exegesis.75 Almost all the debate over retaining the jurisdiction 
was based upon the view that the only purpose served was this 
negative protection against bias. Friendly saw the principal reason 
for the jurisdiction as a "desire to protect creditors against legisla-
tion favorable to debtors."76 In similar fashion, Professor John 
Frank viewed the jurisdiction as wholly intended to serve the in-
terests of the commercial classes.77 
But it is at least equally possible that an affirmative purpose 
for the jurisdiction was intended. Not only was the citizen to be 
protected through enforcement of the privileges and immunities 
clause on appeal from discriminatory treatment in the state courts; 
he was also to have the affirmative institutional protection of his 
substantive rights in an impartial tribunal. This would work two 
74 THE FEDERALisr No. 80, at 343 (Beard ed. 1948) (Hamilton). 
75 Friendly, The Historic Basis of the Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REv. 483, 
492-93 n.44 (1928). 
76 Id. at 496-97. "Not unnaturally the commercial interests of the country were 
reluctant to expose themselves to the hazards of litigation before such courts as these. 
They might be good enough for the inhabitants of their respective states, but merchants 
from abroad felt themselves entitled to something better. There was a vague feeling 
that the new courts would be strong courts, creditors' courts, business men's courts." 
Id. at 498. 
77 Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 
3, 28 (1948), concluding: "To summarize, the diversity jurisdiction in the federal Con• 
stitution may fairly be said to be the product of three factors, the relative weights of 
which cannot now be asserted: 
"(l) The desire to avoid regional prejudice against commercial litigants, based in 
small part on experience and in large part on common-sense anticipation. 
"(2) The desire to permit commercial, manufacturing, and speculative interests to 
litigate their controversies with other classes, before judges who would be firmly tied 
to their own interests. 
"(3) The desire to achieve more efficient administration of justice for the classes thus 
benefited." 
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ways: the existence of such a tribunal enforcing state law in im-
partial manner side by side with the state courts would force the 
state courts, by self-esteem and popular criticism, to meet the 
same standard. This, in turn, would give a double-barreled en-
couragement to the citizen thinking of travelling into another 
state: that the climate for such travel was improving, and that he 
would always be able to litigate in one of his own courts. The 
salutary effects upon the growth of the nation of such encourage-
ment have been translated into fact. 
It is here that Judge Parker's remarks78 that a citizen is entitled 
to litigate in his own sovereign's courts have relevance. For re-
sponsiveness to political pressure is one of the hallmarks of any 
democracy, and certainly of this American experiment. Just as a 
United States citizen is entitled and encouraged to bring political 
force to bear upon the national legislature in areas of substantive 
law within its power (e.g., the countless congressional regulations 
of interstate commerce), so he is entitled and encouraged to bring 
that force to bear to produce the kind of national tribunal he feels 
himself entitled to. When the American leaves his home state and 
ventures elsewhere within his sovereign's domain, he has a call 
upon that sovereign for judicial service that is responsive to the 
need, viz., a federal tribunal with uniform procedure and uniform 
remedial powers. Though the citizen must still employ a local law-
yer to represent him in that tribunal, the assurance involved goes 
beyond the litigation stage to the planning stage.79 
In addition, another basic trademark of American federalism 
is its proliferation of alternative routes for solution of problems, 
its belief that having fifty different legal systems experimenting 
with solutions to a difficult problem is healthier than having only 
one unitary system. This supports the diversity jurisdiction in 
both the substantive and procedural law areas. For not only is it 
78 Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A.J. 433, 
438 (1932): "When a citizen of the United States must go into a court in the United 
States to assert or defend his rights, he ought to have the right to go into a court 
which is as much his court as it is the court of his adversary. • • . The federal court 
represents all of the people of the United States. • • • If I go into a state court in 
New York, however, I am in a court which represents a sovereignty upon which I 
have no claim." 
70 For example, if the citizen wants to know if he can enter a transaction in a 
foreign state, and still be able to obtain a declaratory judgment of his rights at an 
early stage if foreseeable complications develop, he can plan, or his home counsel can 
advise him to plan, on the availability in the federal courts of the Federal Declaratory 
Judgment Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1958). 
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useful to have the life-tenured, nationally-oriented federal judici-
ary working side by side with the state courts in the fifty substantive 
law laboratories but also it is beneficial to have fifty-one procedural 
law laboratories, with the ubiquitous federal system partaking of 
and giving to the others in a constant process of growth. 
Another function of the diversity jurisdiction that has proved 
not only beneficial but crucial to the administration of justice in 
the nation is its ability to combine and settle in one suit the inter-
ests of many parties whose interests could not be properly handled 
in any one state court. The Federal Interpleader Act80 has crys-
tallized many of these advantages, and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure promote other multi-party litigation. Another possible 
function-temporarily barred by Klaxon but certainly within the 
legislative competence of Congress-would be the development of 
uniform conflict of laws principles applicable to the difficult inter-
state conflicts, a function which seems particularly suitable for 
the federal judiciary. 
At any rate, the inclusion of the diversity jurisdiction in the first 
Judiciary Act and its constant retention and re-affirmation by the 
political arm of the government through every Congress down to 
the present is in itself a strong argument for its vitality and for the 
desirability of the functions it serves. This being so, it is time to 
make sense out of the method of execution of the jurisdiction, 
through congressional legislation guaranteeing a uniform proce-
dure and system of remedies. 
What is needed is a federal court which is responsive to the 
federal citizen's needs. This means a tribunal whose judges are 
appointed by the federal government, whose procedure is as broad 
and as common as the character of the litigant who invokes it, 
that is, a uniform, national procedure, and whose remedies for 
state-given rights of action are equally uniform and available to 
the citizen whether or not such remedy exists in the state courts 
of the forum. All, of course, must remain subject to the basic prin-
ciple of living, working federalism, that when the local interest is 
great enough to outweigh the national interest, uniformity must 
give way to diversity. A frozen example of this latter case is the 
whole field of substantive law not delegated by the states to the 
federal government, the whole regime of primary rights and duties 
80 28 u.s.c. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1958). 
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whose control was restored to the states by Erie. Flexible examples 
of the same situation are the cases where local policies are so strong 
that they outweigh, on a case-by-case basis, the national interest 
in uniformity. 
Given the goal, does Congress have the power to effectuate it? 
B. Congressional Power To Shape Diversity Jurisdiction 
1. Historical Exercise 
The history of congressional legislation leaves little doubt that 
Congress believed that the Constitution gave it authority not only 
to create inferior courts but to control the manner of their opera-
tion. In the first Judiciary Act of 1789,81 the Congress dictated the 
character of the manner and mode of proceedings of the new 
federal courts in the exercise of all the jurisdiction conferred upon 
them. In the fields of equity, admiralty and bankruptcy, a uniform 
federal procedure was chosen.82 The criminal procedure was left 
to development by the judiciary.83 As to actions at law, the first 
Congress adopted the prevailing state procedure used in the 
supreme courts of the states where the federal courts sat.84 When 
the Court held later changes in state procedure did not affect the 
federal duty to conform to the state procedure as of 1789,85 the 
Congress first provided for "static" conformity with state proce-
dure as of 1828,86 and then passed the Conformity Act of June l, 
1872, ordering "dynamic" conformity "as near as may be" with 
the procedure "existing at the time in like causes in the courts of 
record of the State."87 So many exceptions and qualifications were 
engrafted upon the act88 that Congress finally decided to grant 
power to the Court to make uniform rules of federal procedure, 
and to merge law and equity and provide one set of rules for both.89 
This has been the law since 1938. 
81 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
82 See generally HART 8e WESCHLER 578-90. 
ss Later, specific rule-making power was conferred upon the courts in 1933 and 
1940. Act of Feb. 24, 1933, ch. 119, 47 Stat. 904, as amended by Act of March 8, 1934, 
ch. 48, 48 Stat. 399; Act of June 29, 1940, 54 Stat. 688, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1958). 
Si Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93. 
sis Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (IO Wheat.) 1 (1825). 
so The Process Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278. 
87 Conformity Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196. 
88 See HART &: WECHsLER 585. 
89 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 [now 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958)]: "The 
Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district 
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With respect to substance, the first Congress provided for 
diversity in the applicable substantive law in actions at law: 
"That the laws of the several states, except where the constitu-
tion, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise 
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in 
trials at common law in the Courts of the United States in 
cases where they apply."90 
Whether a statute was required for this purpose has been ques-
tioned, for the Court has often declared that the Rules of Decision 
Act "is merely declarative of the rule which would exist in the ab-
sence of the statute."91 
2. Judicial Precedent 
While the Congress has thus constantly exercised its supposed 
power to control the character of the inferior federal courts, the 
Court has been no less clear in holding that the power does in 
fact exist. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in upholding the earlier 
"static" conformity act over a contrary later state statute, declared: 
"That a power to make laws for carrying into execution all 
the judgments which the judicial department has power to 
pronounce, is expressly conferred by this clause, seems to be 
one of those plain propositions which reasoning cannot render 
plainer. The terms of the clause neither require nor admit of 
elucidation. The court, therefore, will only say, that no doubt 
whatever is entertained, on the power of Congress over the 
subject. The only inquiry is, how far has this power been 
exercised?"92 
In the same year the Court re-affirmed the power of Congress 
courts of the United States and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms 
of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions 
at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of 
any litigant. They shall take effect six months after their promulgation, and thereafter 
all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect. Sec. 2. The Court 
may at any time unite the general rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those 
in action and procedure for both: Provided, however, That in such union of rules the 
right of trial by jury as at common law and declared by the seventh amendment to 
the Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. Such united rules shall 
not take effect until they shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney General 
at the beginning of a regular session thereof and until after the close of such session." 
90 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 [now 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958)]. 
91 Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 559 (1923); Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 30 
U.S. (5 Pet.) 457,464 (1831); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938). 
92 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1825). 
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to control procedure, and also held that the Rules of Decision Act 
had no application to federal procedure: 
"But it does not rest altogether upon such implication; for 
express authority is given to congress to make all laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all 
the powers vested by the Constitution in the government of 
the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. 
The right of congress, therefore, to regulate the proceedings 
on executions, and direct the mode and manner and out of 
what property of the debtor satisfaction may be obtained, is 
not to be questioned, and the only inquiry is, how far this 
power has been exercised." 
". . . [Section 34] has no application to the practice of the 
courts, or in any manner calls upon them to pursue the vari-
ous changes which may take place from time to time in the 
state courts, with respect to their processes, and modes of 
proceedings under them."93 
The decision in Beers v. Haughton94 made it clear that state rules 
of procedure had effect in the federal courts only by virtue of 
adoption by the Congress, and that this power of Congress could 
be lawfully delegated to the Court in the form of rule-making 
power: 
"State laws cannot control the exercise of the national govern-
ment, nor in any manner limit or affect the operation of the 
process or proceedings in the national courts. The whole 
efficacy of such laws in the courts of the United States, de-
pends upon the enactments of congress. So far as they are 
adopted by congress, they are obligatory; beyond this, they 
have no controlling influence. Congress may adopt such state 
laws directly, by a substantive enactment, or they may confide 
the authority to adopt them to the courts of the United 
States."95 
93 The Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 53-54 (1825). 
94 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 329 (1835). 
95 Id. at 359. The Court added: "Examples of both sorts exist in the national 
legislation. The process act of 1789, ch. 21, expressly adopted the forms of writs and 
modes of process of the state courts, in suits at common law. The act of 1792, ch. 36, 
permanently continued the forms of writs, executions and other process, and the forms 
and modes of proceeding in suits at common law, then in use in the courts of the 
United States, under the process act of 1789; but with this remarkable difference, that 
they were subject to such alterations and additions as the said courts respectively 
should, in their discretion, deem expedient, or to such regulations as the supreme court 
of the United States should think proper, from time to time, by rule, to prescribe to 
any circuit or district court concerning the same." 
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When the validity of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
was challenged, the Court considered both the power of the Con-
gress so to legislate and the validity of the delegation of rule-
making power to the Court as closed issues: 
"Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and 
procedure of the federal courts, and may exercise that power 
by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make 
rules not inconsistent with the statutes or Constitution of the 
United States."96 
The Court was no less emphatic that state rules of procedure 
not adopted by the Congress have no application in the federal 
courts. Having disposed of a state statute in Beers, it similarly 
rejected in Herron v. Southern Pac. Co.91 a provision in a state 
constitution requiring the issue of contributory negligence to go 
to the jury: 
"The controlling principle governing the decision of the 
present question is that state laws cannot alter the essential 
character or function of a federal court. The function of the 
trial judge in a federal court is not in any sense a local matter, 
and state statutes which would interfere with the appropriate 
performance of that function are not binding upon the 
federal court under either the Conformity Act or the 'rules 
of decision' Act."98 
The Court listed other state procedural provisions that had been 
held without force upon federal judges:99 state procedural rules 
requiring that the court not give an instruction to the jury unless 
reduced to writing, that written instructions shall be taken by the 
jury in their retirement, that the court shall require the jury to 
answer special interrogatories in addition to their general verdict, 
that the court shall not express any opinion upon the facts, that 
the court shall not charge the jury with respect to matters of fact, 
or that that court shall not direct a verdict where the evidence is 
such that a verdict the other way would be set aside. Although 
Herron is pre-Erie, it has been expressly re-affirmed by the Court 
in its 1958 Byrd opinion.100 
96 Sibbach v. Wilson &: Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941). 
97 283 U.S. 91 (1931). 
1l8 Id. at 94. 
1l9 Id. at 94-95. 
100 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958). Diederich v. 
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In addition to thus upholding congressional power over proce-
dure, the Court also held that the availability of a remedy in a 
federal court could not be defeated by state legislation either 
specifically attempting to oust the federal courts of jurisdiction or 
taking away the existence of the remedy in the state courts. In 
Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r,101 a Wisconsin statute conferred 
a right of action for wrongful death, subject to the proviso that 
the action be brought in a Wisconsin state court. Nevertheless, 
the Court allowed recovery in a federal court action, holding that 
state-given general rights can be enforced in any federal court with 
jurisdiction of the parties: 
"Whenever a general rule as to property or personal rights, 
or injuries to either, is established by State legislation, its en-
forcement by a Federal Court in a case between proper parties 
is a matter of course, and the jurisdiction of the court, in such 
case, is not subject to State limitation."102 
In its determination to protect the constitutional right of a non-
resident to seek a remedy in a federal court, the Court has con-
sistently held state statutes exacting agreement by a foreign cor-
poration not to remove actions to a federal court to be void and 
ineffectual to oust jurisdiction from the federal court.103 
In like manner, the Court early held that the absence of a 
remedy in the state court did not bar the existence of a remedy in 
the federal court. In Suydam v. Broadnax,104 the defendant moved 
to dismiss a federal suit on the ground that a state statute barred 
any suit against anyone "represented to be insolvent." The Court 
held that even if the defendant had been judicially declared in-
solvent under the state statute, such action could not bar suit in 
a federal court by a non-party nonresident. Later, in The Union 
Bank of Tenn. v. folly's Adm'rs,1°5 the defendant in a similar suit 
claimed that Broadnax meant only that the nonresident could sue, 
but that the state insolvency proceeding must be decisive of any 
American News Co., 128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1942) is a post-Erie case reaching the same 
result as Herron and cited with approval in Byrd. 
101 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1871). 
102 Id. at 286. 
103 Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874); Terral v. Burke Constr. 
Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922). 
l0i 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 67 (1840). 
l0li 59 U.S. (18 How.) 503 (1955). 
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remedy against the defendant. The Court rejected this argument, 
affirming the plaintiff's recovery in a federal suit: 
"But we do not deem it necessary to discuss them in detail, 
for the law of a State limiting the remedies of its citizens in 
its own courts cannot be applied to prevent the citizens of 
other States from suing in the courts of the United States in 
that State for recovery of any property or money there, to 
which they may be legally or equitably entitled."100 
The Court has thus consistently upheld the power of Congress 
to control the character of the procedure and remedies available 
in diversity jurisdiction, within constitutional limits. It remains to 
consider the scope of these constitutional limits on the exercise of 
that power in the re-shaping of diversity jurisdiction. 
3. Constitutional Limits 
While there are several cases dealing with the constitutional 
limits on extension of the jurisdiction itself, 107 there is a dearth of 
precedent on the limits upon the manner of exercise of the juris-
diction. In fact, there are only two cases restricting the federal 
judiciary in diversity jurisdiction that speak in constitutional 
terms: Erie R.R. v. Tompkins108 and Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. 
of A merica.109 
Whether Erie really was constitutional doctrine has been, and 
is, the subject of debate.11° Mr. Justice Brandeis certainly said it 
was, and it is hard to call dictum a consideration without which, 
according to the Court, the decision would have gone the other 
way. A superficial reading of the case would seem to indicate that 
the "unconstitutionality of the course pursued" was what Brandeis 
said it was: 
106 Id. at 507. While these are pre-Erie cases, it would seem still to be the law 
that "no remedy at all" is substantive but "this remedy instead of that remedy" is 
procedural. 
107 E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Hodgson &: Thompson v. 
Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809). 
10s 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
109 350 U.S. 198 (1956). 
110 See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 489 
(1954); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 427, 541 (1958); 
Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity 
Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187 (1957); Symposium-Federal Trials and Erie Doctrine, 51 Nw. 
U.L. R.Ev. 338 (1956); 66 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1516 (1953); 62 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1030 (1949). See also 
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 557 (1949) (dissenting opinion). 
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"Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of com-
mon law applicable in a state whether they be local in their 
nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the 
law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to 
confer such a power upon the federal courts."111 
While the Court did buttress its opinion with a discussion of 
the discrimination and "injustice and confusion" incident to the 
privilege of the nonresident in selecting the tribunal, the Court's 
conclusion seems to rest the unconstitutionality of Swift v. Tyson 
upon violation of the principles of allocation of powers within a 
federal system: 
"Thus the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice 
Holmes said, 'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by 
courts of the United States which no lapse of tim~ or respect-
able array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct.' In 
disapproving that doctrine we do not hold unconstitutional 
§ 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 or any other Act of 
Congress. We merely declare that in applying the doctrine 
this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in 
our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several 
states. " 112 
Thus Erie puts a basic restriction on the exercise of diversity 
jurisdiction-that the Constitution requires that the federal courts, 
in adjudicating diversity cases, look to the state law for the sub-
stantive law defining the rights and duties of the parties. This 
makes sense, for a system of law would seem to demand that in-
dividuals not be subject to conflicting basic legal commands in 
their everyday actions. That the Constitution requires this has 
been disputed by many commentators,113 who maintain that Con-
111 304 U.S. at 78. The Court then quoted with approval, at 79, the dissent of 
Mr. Justice Field in Baltimore & O. R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893), when the 
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson was extended from commercial law into tort law: "['T]here 
stands, as a perpetual protest against its repetition, the Constitution of the United States, 
which recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the States-inde-
pendence in their legislative and independence in their judicial departments. Super-
vision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no case per-
missible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated 
to the United States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an 
invasion of the authority of the States and to that extent, a denial of its independence." 
112 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938). 
113 COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 144-46 (1942); 
Cowan, Constitutional Aspects of the Abolition of Federal "Common Law," l LA. L. REv. 
161, 171 (1938); McCormick & Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal 
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gress could, if it desired, enact substantive law for diversity litiga-
tion. Mr. Justice Reed said as much in his concurring opinion in 
Erie114 and Mr. Justice Rutledge has been even more explicit.1111 
Those who doubt Erie's constitutional basis, however, uniformly 
approve of its result as a "just principle of federal comity and judi-
cial administration."116 And it is difficult to see how the tenth 
amendment and article three can be read to entitle the citizen 
not only to his own federal tribunal, but also to his own brand of 
law when he engages in transactions with residents of states other 
than his own. 
A more difficult argument against the constitutional overtones 
of Erie has been based upon other enumerated powers given to 
Congress. It has been pointed out that Congress clearly had legisla-
tive power over the very fact situations involved in Swift and 
Erie. Swift involved an interstate commercial transaction; the 
commerce clause gives Congress power to legislate in this area, 
and Congress has repeatedly exercised it. Erie involved a tort 
committed by an agent of interstate transportation; that Congress 
can and has exercised control over the imposition of such burdens 
upon interstate transportation is demonstrated by statutes such as 
the Federal Employers Liability Act.117 Therefore, an argument 
may be constructed as follows: 
(A) Congress could frame the substantive law applicable to 
such transactions whether litigated in state or federal courts; 
(B) And Congress can also do the lesser thing: make sub-
stantive law applicable to such transactions only if litigated in 
the federal courts; 
(C) Therefore the Supreme Court, whose judicial law-mak-
ing power is of the same extent, can judicially evolve the law 
to be applied to such situations when litigated in a federal 
tribunal. 
This argument that Erie is not constitutionally required 1s 
open to challenge on several grounds: 
Courts, 33 ILL. L. R.Ev. 126, 133-36 (1938); Schweppe, What Has Happened to Federal 
Jurisprudence?, 24 A.B.A.J. 421, 423 (1938); cf. Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict 
of Laws, 22 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 405, 468-69 (1955). 
114 304 U.S. at 90-92. 
115 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 558 (1949) (dissenting 
opinion). 
116 See, e.g., Symposium-Federal Trials and the Erie Doctrine, 51 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 
338, 342 (1956). 
117 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958). 
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First, it is not at all clear that Congress could enact substantive 
law in an area within its delegated powers, application of which 
will depend on access to a federal court. While perhaps not rising 
to the dignity of deprivation of equal protection of the laws, it 
would appear to be an abuse of the granted power, which is to 
make law on a subject for the whole nation. In short, the com-
merce clause gives Congress power to enact substantive law applic-
able to an area, not to certain litigants. The judiciary clause gives 
Congress power to enact procedural law applicable to certain 
litigants, not to an area. It seems unsound, as a matter of federal-
ism, to claim these two powers may be added together math-
ematically to produce the power to enact substantive law ap-
plicable only to litigants who can invoke the proper tribunal. 
Secondly, every decision by the Court would have to be pre-
ceded by a decision on the scope of the legislative power of Con-
gress. Such forcing of decisions of constitutional scope would be 
inconsistent with the "great gravity and delicacy" with which the 
Court has approached its task of passing on the validity of an exer-
cise of legislative power, and because of which the Court post-
pones if possible the decision of constitutional questions.118 
Thirdly, the Court would be deciding whether a federal power, 
delegated but as yet dormant, will be now exercised. Since the 
power has been delegated to Congress, that is the body that should 
make the discretionary decision whether to exercise the power. 
Thus, it may not lightly be concluded that Erie is not constitu-
tionally required. Whether or not Erie is constitutional doctrine, 
it certainly rests on fundamental grounds, and any proposal for 
legislation to mend the diversity jurisdiction would do well to 
honor it. 
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America119 involved an em-
ployment contract made in New York with clauses providing for 
arbitration of disputes and for• the application of New York law 
"without regard to the jurisdiction in which any action or special 
proceeding may be instituted." Both contracting parties were New 
York residents, but the employee later became a resident of Ver-
mont where the contract was to be performed. When he brought 
suit in a Vermont state court, the corporation removed, then 
moved to stay the proceedings while arbitration took place under 
118 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (concurring opinion). 
110 350 U.S. 198 (1956). 
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New York law. The district court held Vermont law applied, that 
Vermont law made such arbitration provisions revocable, and 
denied the stay. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the 
Federal Arbitration Act required arbitration and, in the alterna-
tive, that arbitration is merely a form of trial, a matter of proce-
dure not governed by Erie. 
The Supreme Court construed the Federal Arbitration Act as 
not intended to apply to such cases, because otherwise: 
" ... a constitutional question might be presented. Erie R. 
Co. v. Tompkins indicated that Congress does not have the 
constitutional authority to make the law that is applicable to 
controversies in diversity of citizenship cases .... Our view, 
as will be developed, is that § 3, so read, would invade the 
local law field. We therefore read § 3 narrowly to avoid that 
issue."120 
With the federal statute thus out of the way, the Court had no 
trouble holding that arbitration would "substantially affect" the 
outcome and that Vermont law must be applied under York.121 
Whether New York law applied to the contract was also to be 
governed by Vermont law, under Klaxon.122 Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, concurring, was even more explicit on the possibility of 
constitutional limitation.123 
Bernhardt is a puzzling case. It may be nothing more than a 
reflection of the historic opposition of the judiciary to the "ouster" 
of its jurisdiction by arbitration; for it seems incredible that the 
Court would strike down the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 
120 Id. at 202. 
121 Id. at 203. 
122 Id. at 205. 
123 Id. at 207-08. "I agree with the Court's opinion that the differences between 
arbitral and judicial determination of a controversy under a contract sufficiently go to 
the merits of the outcome, and not merely .because of the contingencies of different 
individuals passing on the same question, to make the matter one of 'substance' in 
the sense relevant for Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. In view of the ground that was taken 
in that case for its decision, it would raise a serious question of constitutional law 
whether Congress could subject to arbitration litigation in the federal courts which is 
there solely because it is 'between citizens of different states,' U.S. Const., Art. III, 
Section 2, in disregard of the law of the State in which a federal court is sitting. Since 
the United States Arbitration Act of 1925 does not obviously apply to diversity cases, 
in the light of its terms and the relevant interpretive materials, avoidance of the con-
stitutional question is for me sufficiently compelling to lead to a construction of the 
Act as not applicable to diversity cases. Of course this implies no opinion on the con-
stitutional question that would be presented were Congress specifically to make the 
Arbitration Act applicable in such cases." 
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for example, on the ground that it might "substantially affect" the 
outcome. The opinion is unsatisfying because, like York, it makes 
nothing turn on which state's law governs the right to arbitration. 
The Court stated: "The nature of the tribunal where suits are 
tried is an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of 
action."124 But it proceeds to hold that the Vermont policy against 
arbitration governs the suit in the federal court, regardless of the 
fact that the "parcel of rights" is conferred by New York law. 
While, as will be discussed, this may be a wise policy of comity, it 
is difficult to find a constitutional mandate that the substantive law 
which admittedly creates the cause of action shall not be applied 
in a federal court sitting in a different state which neither grants 
such a substantive right nor allows its enforcement in its state 
courts. 
Aside from Erie and Bernhardt, all the other cases responsible 
for the present condition of the diversity jurisdiction turn upon: 
(1) construction of the Rules of Decision Act-an interpretation of 
what Congress meant by it, as crystallized in York; (2) construction 
of the Enabling Act of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (3) 
stare decisis-accepting as binding precedent the judge-made 
policy decision in York that a federal court adjudicating a diversity 
case should be "only another court of the State." 
It is a major premise of this article that all these other decisions 
are perched like so many dominoes upon the above three bases, 
and will topple when the recommended congressional legislation 
shifts those bases. 
4. Underlying Principles 
Passing precedent to principle in the investigation of congres-
sional power to re-shape diversity litigation, we find the diversity 
jurisdiction is but a phase of the larger problem of the meshing of 
the legal systems of two sovereigns in the territory of any state. In 
the state sovereign's courts, the procedural law is state-governed, 
the substantive law is federal if within the delegated national pow-
ers and state if not so delegated. In the federal sovereign's courts, 
the procedural law is federal, the substantive law is federal if 
within the delegated national powers and state if not so delegated. 
As long as each sovereign's law is enforced in his own courts, there 
124 Id. at 203. 
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is no problem, since the substantive law grows up within the pro-
cedural law. The inevitable conflict arises when one sovereign's 
substantive law is applied in the other sovereign's tribunal, for 
example, in the "forced" jurisdiction of the state courts over fed-
eral law,125 or in federal diversity jurisdiction applying state law. 
When the forum's procedures qualify, modify or affect in any way 
the substantive rights in litigation, the cry is raised that the forum 
has exceeded its law-making power-that to "abridge" a right in 
an area is to "enact" a contrary right in that same area, which is, 
by hypothesis, beyond the legislative competence of the forum's 
sovereign. The traditional answer, of course, is that procedure has 
always qualified substance, that the whole history of the growth 
of our Anglo-American system of law has been that of substance 
growing within forms of action and being qualified thereby. 
But here that answer breaks down, for that tradition is of the 
same sovereign's procedural law qualifying its own substantive 
law, and that will not justify a different sovereign's procedural law 
doing it. Were the sovereigns equal, a flat impasse would result. 
But they are not equal; article six of the Constitution provides 
that "the laws of the United States" shall be "the supreme law 
of the land," and it binds the state judges accordingly, "any thing 
in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwith-
standing." 
Given congressional power to enact uniform rules of procedure, 
what of uniform independent federal remedies? When a state 
grants or denies a remedy inside its borders, does the Constitution 
order the federal court to obey? For much the same reasons as 
given above, the answer would seem to be no. Given a right of 
action created by some state's law, the availability of a remedy for 
it in a federal court would seem to be entirely a matter of federal 
law. To take an easy case, until recently there has been a private 
right of action to enjoin organizational picketing under the laws 
of several states,126 but the Norris-LaGuardia Act,127 as a matter of 
125 See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
126 See Gamer v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) which eliminated this right 
on the ground that it conflicted with federal remedies under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. 
127 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958). However, the National Labor 
Relations Act, as amended, exempts federal courts from the requirements of Norris-
LaGuardia with respect to National Labor Relations Board petitions for injunctive relief. 
NLRA § I0(h), added by 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(h) (1958). 
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federal law, forbids a federal court to give such injunctive relief. 
The opposite case, where a federal remedy is available when a 
state remedy is not, is exemplified by Guffey v. Smith,128 in which 
discovery and accounting were allowed in a federal equity suit for 
an injunction, even though the state had held equitable relief 
barred in such cases. Whether Guffey survives York is uncertain 
as matter of precedent, 129 but the congressional power to provide 
for such a result does not appear open to constitutional challenge. 
A harder case exists when a state's law provides that gambling 
contracts made inside the state are unenforceable obligations and 
that those made outside the state will not be enforced in its courts 
because they are violative of "public policy." Certainly, as to 
gambling contracts entered into in that state, no court, state or 
federal, in any jurisdiction, should enforce them. Assuming that 
the appropriate conflicts rules applies the law of that state, there is 
no substantive right to take into any tribunal. But it seems equally 
certain that as to contracts made outside that state-in Nevada or 
Monaco-that substantive rights exist and will be enforced in 
those states' courts or any neutral tribunal. The federal tribunal 
in the "no-gambling" state is just as neutral and should be just 
as free to enforce those out-of-state contracts. To be sure, there is 
an extremely strong case for comity and for following the local 
policy and refusing to let "such things be done in our state." But 
it is as a matter of comity and not as constitutional command that 
the state policy is honored. In effect, the federal tribunal adopts as 
its O't\Til the local policy, but remains free to reject any policy it 
does not approve of. Once again, the desirability of "one-ness" 
against "many-ness" must be weighed, and the uniform national 
practice stayed if the local interest is deemed weighty enough.130 
12s 237 U.S. 101 (1915). 
120 See HART &: WECHSLER 650-59; Black &: Yates, Inc. v. l\Iahogany Ass'n, 129 F.2d 
227 (3d Cir. 1941). 
130 Much of this has been said before, by Mr. Justice Rutledge in his dissents in 
Ragan, Cohen and Woods. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 
558-60 (1949) he stated: "What is being applied is a gloss on the Erie rule, not the 
rule itself. That case held that federal courts in diversity cases must apply state law, 
decisional as well as statutory, in determining matters of substantive law, in particular 
and apart from procedural limitations upon its assertion-whether a cause of action 
exists. I accept that view generally and insofar as it involves a wise rule of adminis-
tration for the federal courts, though I have grave doubt that it has any solid consti-
tutional foundation. 
"But the Erie case made no ruling that in so deciding diversity cases a federal 
court is 'merely another court of the state in which it sits,' and hence that in every 
situation in which the doors of state courts are closed to a suitor, so must be also 
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v. A PROPOSAL FOR CONGRESSIONAL REPAIR 
Given the congressional power and the need for its exercise, 
how shall it be done? The propriety of the method to be used is 
something Congress continually must decide, for any legislature 
always has a variety of weapons in its arsenal.131 The weapon 
needed here is one that is distinctively legislative-a wholesale 
removal of debris to clear the way for a fresh attack upon a difficult 
problem. Therefore, the method of disapproving specific decisions, 
if ever appropriate action for a legislature,132 must be rejected 
here. Following along the lines of the basic "substance-procedure" 
distinction, the recommended legislation involves amending both 
the Enabling Act of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure133 and 
the Rules of Decision Act.134 
A. Statutory Amendments 
I. The Enabling Act 
The Enabling Act grants to the Supreme Court the power to 
make general rules of procedure, but with the restriction: "Such 
those of the federal courts. Not only is this not true when the state bar is raised 
by a purely procedural obstacle. There is sound historical reason for believing that 
one of the purposes of the diversity clause was to afford a federal court remedy when, 
for at least some reasons of state policy, none would be available in the state courts. 
It is the gloss which has been put upon the Erie ruling by later decisions, e.g., Guaranty 
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, which in my opinion is being applied to extend the Erie 
ruling far beyond its original purpose or intent and, in my judgment, with consequences 
and implications seriously impairing Congress' power, within its proper sphere of action, 
to control this type of litigation in the federal courts. 
"The accepted dichotomy is the familiar 'procedural-substantive' one. This of course 
is a subject of endless discussion, which hardly needs to be repeated here. Suffice it 
to say that actually in many situations procedure and substance are so interwoven that 
rational separation becomes well-nigh impossible. But, even so, this fact cannot dis-
pense with the necessity of making a distinction. For, as the matter stands, it is Con-
gress which has the power to govern the procedure of the federal courts in diversity 
cases, and the states which have that power over matters clearly substantive in nature. 
Judges therefore cannot escape making the division. And they must make it where the 
two constituent elements are Siamese twins as well as where they are not twins or 
even blood brothers. The real question is not whether the separation shall be made, 
but how it shall be made: whether mechanically by reference to whether the state 
courts' doors are open or closed, or by a consideration of the policies which close 
them and their relation to accommodating the policy of the Erie rule with Congress' 
power to govern the incidents of litigation in diversity suits. 
"It is in these close cases, this borderland area, that I think we are going too far." 
131 See HART &: SACKS, nm LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN TIIE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 730-48 (Tent. ed. 1957). 
132 Id. at 800-10, 837-60. 
133 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1958). 
134 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1958). 
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rules shall not abridge, enlarge nor modify any substantive right 
and shall preserve the right of trial by jury .... " 135 This language 
is actually not open to challenge as it stands, if there were any 
guarantee that "substantive right" would be held to mean primary 
right and duty at the stage of everyday action, or what may be 
called "pre-litigation conduct." Since there is no such guarantee, 
however, this phrase sticks out as a handle for the federal rules to 
be held outside the statutory grant whenever they affect, as they 
must, the enforcement of such rights in litigation. Therefore this 
clause must be amended to prevent the voiding of the rules on the 
ground that what "substantially affects" the litigation of a right is 
"substantive" law. What is needed is a new proviso making it clear 
that such rules may not create, deny or modify primary rights and 
duties at the stage of pre-litigation conduct, but may substantially 
afject the judicial enforcement of such rights in the interest of 
perfecting and maintaining a uniform body of federal procedure. 
In other words, such rules may regulate court procedure, not the 
underlying substantive law to be applied. This is, in effect, a frozen 
weighing of interests of the kind proposed by Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge, a presumption in favor of uniformity over diversity. Judge 
Goodrich put it in a slightly different manner: 
"In view of the admitted federal power over procedure in the 
federal courts, it is submitted that when the Congress has 
exercised that power, it has, in a sense 'occupied' the field 
and the test should be whether the rule has any relation as to 
how a federal court shall conduct its business. If it does, the 
rule should be upheld."136 
2. The Rules of Decision Act 
The Rules of Decision Act was enacted by the first Congress 
and has come down to the present time with but a minor change in 
form. It reads: 
"The laws of the several states, except where the Constitu-
tion or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress other-
wise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision 
in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases 
where they apply.''137 
135 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1958). 
136 GooDRICH, CoNFucr OF LAws 43 (3d ed. 1949). 
137 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1958). 
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At first glance, the language of this provision seems similarly un-
assailable, if there were any guarantee that "rules of decision" 
would be confined to substantive rules of law, that the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure would be allowed their proper status as 
acts of Congress, and that the concluding phrase would be read to 
empower the federal courts both to choose the applicable state sub-
stantive law and to weigh the local state "door-closing" and similar 
policies. Since there is no such guarantee, however, the act should 
be amended to make it clear that it is indeed "merely declarative 
of the rule which would exist in the absence of the statute," i.e., 
that it merely restates the constitutional mandate that state sub-
stantive law governs what has not been delegated to the national 
government. 
The act should be further amended to provide that when there 
is a conflict as to which state's law is the applicable one, the choice 
of law shall be made by the federal court in accordance with its 
uniform choice-of-law principles so as to make it clear that no 
litigant has a substantive right to choice-of-law doctrines, which 
characteristically vary with the forum and are everywhere called 
procedural. It also should be made clear that a state's policy in 
closing the doors of its courts or prohibiting certain remedies is 
not automatically binding on the federal court, i.e., that some such 
policies may be "substantive" when all the contacts of the suit are 
with that state, but that in most cases they will not be and will fall 
outside the Rules of Decision Act. Provision should be made for 
the weighing of such policies and their adoption if the local out-
weighs the national interest. It would be desirable for the com-
mittee report on the amendments to state that their purpose was 
to eradicate the idea that, for diversity purposes, the federal court 
is "only another court of the state," and to declare that there is no 
"principle of uniformity within a state" and that these amendments 
are aimed at reviving the much-maligned but essential "substance-
procedure" distinction in its proper constitutional dimension. 
For the benefit of both the quality of diversity litigation and 
the development of state substantive law, the role of the federal 
judiciary in finding the state substantive law to be applied must 
be expanded. While the state's highest court, and, a fortiori, the 
state legislature, have the last say on any issue of state law, the 
federal court must be as free as the state's highest court in finding 
what that law is and reconciling conflicting decisions and statutes. 
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In the development of new areas of law, harmonizing the old and 
creating exceptions to old rules to conform to new conditions, the 
litigants are entitled to just as creative a role from the federal 
court as from the state court. Therefore, it should be provided that 
the federal courts, in applying the applicable substantive law, shall 
be as free in ascertaining and applying that law as the highest court 
of that state would be. 
Finally, although it should not be necessary for the legislature 
to take such action, provision should be made for dismissal without 
prejudice whenever a litigant seeking the aid of the federal courts 
is unable to comply with the federal qualifications of suit. As will 
be discussed, this requires the overturning of the case of Venner 
v. Great Northern Ry.138 This must be done in order to clarify the 
status of the federal rules and door-closing doctrines as matters · 
pertaining solely to the federal forum and not partaking of the 
Swift v. Tyson invasion of the local law field. 
B. Operation and Effect of the Proposed Regime 
Were the recommended array of statutory changes enacted, the 
federal judges would be set free to work out a meaningful accom-
modation of state and federal interests in the diversity jurisdiction. 
The old shibboleths would be vitiated, the "uniformity" prece-
dents wiped off the books or qualified, and all doubts that Congress 
has put its full constitutional power behind a uniform federal 
procedure dispersed. The full effect upon the existing precedents 
and the manner in which a federal judge should then go about his 
job remain to be examined. 
I. Finding and Applying the Applicable Substantive Law 
When a diversity case is presented to a federal district court, 
the judge has no doubt that the substantive law he will apply to 
that controversy will be state-created. Erie, whether constitutional 
doctrine or not, is unchanged by the proposed congressional action. 
But the judge must further decide: Which state's law applies? and: 
What is it? 
The Rules of Decision Act, in its closing phrase, "in cases 
where they apply," certainly seemed to empower the federal judi-
1ss 209 U.S. 24: (1908). 
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ciary to make the "choice-of-law" decision in diversity litigation. 
And so the act was read down to Erie139 and even after Erie140 
until the day Klaxon v. Stentor141 and Griffin v. McCoach142 were 
decided. In Klaxon the federal court sitting in Delaware in a 
diversity case held that a New York statute adding interest to a 
verdict went to the substance of the obligation under the New 
York contract at issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
the federal court must follow the Delaware conflicts law, not what 
the court of appeals had found to be "the better view," and enun-
ciating the "principle of uniformity within a state."143 The Court 
reached the same result in Griffin, without adverting to the cir-
cumstance that it involved a bill of interpleader which brought 
into the Texas federal court parties who could not possibly have 
been subjected to Texas law in a Texas state court.144 
Both these decisions would be undone by the proposed congres-
sional legislation, which is a mean between the two extremes of a 
congressional conflict-of-laws statute applicable in state as well as 
federal courts, as proposed by Professor Cheatham,145 and complete 
state control over federal choice-of-law rules, as required by 
Klaxon. As has been noted before, the federal courts in diversity 
litigation are in a peculiarly advantageous position to develop 
uniform impartial conflicts rules. One of the most subtle forms of 
bias in state court litigation is that in favor of the court's own 
legal system. Since it takes an egregious manipulation of conflicts 
rules to violate due process146 or the full faith and credit clause,147 
139 See Boseman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937); Burns Mort-
gage Co. v. Fried, 292 U.S. 487, 493-94 (1934); cases collected in Note, Application by 
Federal Courts of State Rules on Conflict of Laws, 41 CoLU:M. L. REv. 1403, n.3 (1941). 
140 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
141 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
142 Id. at 498. 
143 Id. at 496: "The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal 
court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware's state courts. 
Otherwise the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal ad-
ministration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side. See 
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, [304 U.S.] at 74-77. Any other ruling would do violence 
to the principle of uniformity within a state, upon which the Tompkins decision is 
based. Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in different 
states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits 
permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those 
of its neighbors. It is not for the federal courts to thwart such local policies by en-
forcing an independent 'general law' of conflict of laws." 
144 See HART & WECHSLER 636, 669. 
145 Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 581 (1953). 
146 See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). 
147 See Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947). 
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and since all agree that diversity jurisdiction serves at least the 
purpose of combating subtle bias, a better case could hardly be 
found for requiring an independent federal decision on the choice 
of the law to be applied.148 
This raises the specter of forum-shopping for a favorable sub-
stantive law and all the "injustice and confusion" of Swift v. Tyson. 
The local litigant who loses, it is said, does not care whether the 
opinion which refused to apply local law cites Swift or a contra-
Klaxon rule. There are several answers to this. First, the federal 
court is choosing among state laws, not making "general" law, and 
hence the unconstitutional conduct condemned by Erie is not 
present. Second, a certain amount of forum-shopping is necessary 
in our fifty-one-sovereign union. A citizen who is favored by the 
conflicts rules of state A and prejudiced by those of state B must 
keep out of state B. But with a contra-Klaxon rule, as recom-
mended, he could predict the outcome in every federal tribunal in 
every state. Third, the discrimination of forum-shopping has never 
been raised to constitutional dimensions. If it is felt serious 
enough, Congress could provide that any suit in a state court in-
volving diversity of citizenship could be removed without regard 
to amount upon a showing of a substantial federal question of 
conflict of laws.149 This would eliminate the discrimination of 
different results between 10,000-dollar and 9,999-dollar cases, and 
the "unfairness" of letting the out-of-state citizen choose the forum. 
While this would put an added burden on the federal courts 
of developing a federal conflicts law, it should not add appreciably 
to the Supreme Court's burden. It is not necessary that choice of 
law in suits between diverse citizens in any tribunal become 
thereby a federal question. Short of an "all or nothing" rule, the 
federal courts can be allowed to develop federal conflicts rules for 
federal court litigation, leaving the state courts to apply their rules 
to suits brought into the state courts. The Supreme Court could 
umpire the process, granting certiorari when necessary to resolve 
conflicts between the circuits. 
Having ascertained which state's law applies upon an inde-
pendent basis, the federal court then embarks upon a partnership 
HS But see Freund, Federal-State Relations in the Opinions of Judge Magruder, 72 
HARV. L. R.Ev. 1204 (1959). 
149 Suggested in Hart, The Relations Between :State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. 
R.Ev. 489, 514 (1954). 
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venture with the state courts to discover what that state law is. 
The recommended revisions give it the same power that the state's 
highest court has to harmonize existing precedents, statutes, and 
policies to come up with the rules of decision that apply to the 
facts before it. If an old precedent has become outmoded by 
changes in customs and other circumstances, the federal court 
should be as free as the state courts to refuse to follow it. Whether 
the federal court should be bound by the same doctrine of stare 
decisis as the state court follows is a different question. A court's 
approach to existing precedent smacks of court rule and procedure 
in which a federal interest exists; but the resulting "making" of 
law, where the state court would not, would be too close to the 
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson to be tolerable. A state whose courts 
regarded themselves as unable to overrule an unsound precedent 
would find out-of-state citizens were not bound by it and were 
getting a different law in the federal courts. While the resulting 
polical pressure by residents for a legislative overturning of the 
unsound rule might be a healthy prospect, the intervening federal-
state friction would be highly undesirable. The federal court 
therefore should adopt the same attitude toward precedents as the 
state's highest court entertains. 
2. Door-Closing Policies160 
Having assumed jurisdiction of a suit involving diversity of 
citizenship, and having applied the substantive law to determine 
if a right of action exists, the federal court must next turn to con-
sider whether its hand should be stayed by various local policies 
of the state in which it sits. These policies are but part of a larger, 
multifarious problem. Federal courts may close their doors to cer-
tain litigants or certain causes of action, or, accepting the suit, 
deny the availability of certain requested relief. Similarly, state 
courts may close their doors to certain litigants or causes of action, 
or, accepting the suit, deny the availability of a specified remedy. 
These are, essentially, independent actions on the part of each 
sovereign which should have no effect upon the other sovereign's 
courts. 
However, rules of substantive law, which Erie requires the 
federal courts to follow, may be masked under such policies. Also, 
150 See generally HART 8e WECHSLER 637-78. 
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some such policies are so strong that the federal court must, as a 
matter of practical working federalism, adopt and follow them. 
Therefore the federal court must carefully weigh these local 
policies. The essential point here is that the proposed legislation 
does away with mechanical application of the policies in both 
st_ate and federal courts. Instead, an intelligent examination of 
such policies is substituted in order to discover: 
(1) Is the policy really a principle of substantive law which is 
applicable to the controversy under the federal conflicts rule? 
(2) If not, is the state policy intended to apply in the federal 
courts? By "intended" is meant both actual intent and implied 
intent where the application in the federal forum is necessary to 
the fruition of the policy. 
(3) If it is, is there any federal interest which would move a 
federal forum to adopt and apply this state policy? In other words, 
is the paramount federal interest in keeping the union together 
better served in this case by uniformity or diversity? Is the local 
policy so strong that, as a matter of comity and not of command, 
the courts of the federal sovereign that happen to be sitting in that 
state should follow suit? 
In making this policy decision, the fundamental consideration 
to be borne in mind is that the Constitution allots the control of 
the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts to Congress, not to 
the states. The proposed legislation delegates that power to up-
hold jurisdiction to the federal courts, on a case-by-case evaluation 
of state door-closing policies. 
In light of the foregoing summary of how a federal judge 
should approach his job on this subject, what remains of the pre-
cedents? Guaranty Trust Co. v. York151 applied the forum state's 
statute of limitations to an equity suit in the federal court, without 
investigating whether the applicable substantive law was the law 
of the forum or the law of some other state. The primary impor-
tance of the case is that it selected the forum-shopping element in 
Erie and erected it into a new principle of decision that underlies 
all the cases enunciating the "uniformity within a state" doctrine. 
The proposed legislation not only eradicates that doctrine but 
compels the investigation into the underlying substantive law that 
York neglected to make. It is unfortunate that the key case in this 
m 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
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area of door-closing should involve statutes of limitation. The 
precise classification of these statutes as substance or procedure is 
in a state of flux and transition. It once was relatively clear that 
statutes of limitation were but procedural rules of the forum. 
Recently, however, periods of limitation "written into" statutes 
creating rights of action have begun to be honored as "substantive" 
by the forum state.152 This being so, the federal court must first 
look to see if the forum state's law creates and controls the right 
of action. If it does, then the court must decide if the statute of 
limitations extinguishes the right ("substantive") or is merely 
directed at regulating the staleness of claims that will be enter-
tained in the state courts. If the former, then the federal court 
should honor the limitation as any other substantive rule. If the 
latter, then the federal court is free to make its own decision on 
the staleness of claims that it will entertain, but probably should 
follow the state period unless there is some compelling reason not 
to do so. On the other hand, if the substantive law creating and 
controlling the right of action is that of some other state and not 
that of the forum state, then the force of the forum statute of limi-
tations is greatly diminished. If, for example, the cause of action 
comes from state B with a built-in two-year statute of limitations, 
and the defendant has fled into state A because of its one-year 
statute of limitations, the federal court should apply the longer 
"substantive" period.153 But if the cause of action comes with no 
such period of limitations, then the federal court is free to decide 
the staleness of suits it will hear, and probably will follow the 
forum period, as the federal courts generally do with federal rights 
of action without built-in limitation. 
The problem is a little easier to visualize in the context of 
Angel v. Bullington154 and First National Bank v. United Air 
Lines.155 In both cases local statutes closed the doors of state courts 
to causes of action created by another state's laws. Angel held the 
statute closed the doors of the federal court, too, avoiding deciding 
the constitutional validity of the statute because the petitioner had 
lost that issue by res judicata. In United the Court reached the 
152 See Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 541 
(1958). 
153 This would require the reversal of ·wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 
(1953). 
154 330 U.S. 183 (1947). 
155 225 U.S. 396 (1912). 
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constitutional issue and held the statute no bar to suit in the fed-
eral court because it violated the full faith and credit clause. Both 
cases accepted York and therefore the proposed congressional legis-
lation requires their re-thinking or re-evaluation. 
The policy of the statute in United-to cut down on the num-
ber of cases in the state courts-is obviously not intended to apply 
to the federal court calendar and should not deter the federal 
court from entertaining the suit. The policy of the statute in 
Angel-that mortgagees should not be entitled to deficiency judg-
ments-was intended to apply throughout North Carolina. As to 
mortgages made in that state, there existed no substantive right to 
a deficiency judgment and the federal court was compelled under 
Erie not to award such a judgment. But as to mortgages entered 
into in Virginia, a substantive right to a deficiency judgment was 
created in the mortgagee which he could enforce anywhere except 
in the state courts of North Carolina. A federal court should en-
force that substantive right, whether it sits in Virginia or in North 
Carolina. It may be that some such local policies are so strong that 
they should be followed by the federal court, but that would be a 
matter of adoption after weighing the local and national interests. 
The difficulty of determining whether a local policy goes to the 
substantive rights or merely to the regulation of state court litiga-
tion is illustrated by three cases involving "qualifications of suit-
ors": David Lupton's Sons v. Automobile Club of America,156 
·woods v. Interstate Realty,151 and Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial 
Loan Corp.158 Lupton's Sons was a 1912 case in which the forum 
state's law required corporations to qualify to do business in the 
state before suing in the state courts. The Court examined the 
policy, found that it did not make contracts entered into in the 
state by such corporations void but merely barred such corpora-
tions from suing on them in the state courts. The Court concluded 
that the non-qualifying corporation could enforce the contract in 
any other forum, including the federal court in that state: 
"The State could not prescribe the qualifications of suitors 
in the courts of the United States, and could not deprive of 
their privileges those who were entitled under the Constitu-
156 225 U.S. 489 (1912). 
157 337 U.S. 535 (1949). 
m 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
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tion and laws of the United States to resort to the Federal 
courts for the enforcement of a valid contract."159 
This case was called "obsolete" in Angel160 and overruled in 
Woods, which involved an almost identical Mississippi statute. In 
Woods the Court relied on York and Angel, neither of which in-
volved a locally-created substantive right for which suit was barred 
only in the local courts. The proposed congressional legislation 
would eliminate the automatic approach of Woods and return to 
the Lupton's Sons requirement of evaluating the local policy. If 
it goes to the substantive right, then none exists to be enforced 
anywhere. If it goes only to the right to sue in New York courts, 
then it is not binding upon the federal courts, but would probably 
be followed as to such local contracts. But if it attempts also to bar 
suit in New York courts by such non-qualifying corporations to 
enforce other contracts created and governed by other states' la,;y, 
then the federal court is not only not bound by this policy but 
should accept the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the diverse 
citizenship of the parties and not by the state law. 
Cohen was a shareholders' derivative suit against a Delaware 
corporation and its officers in a New Jersey federal court. The 
Court first applied Klaxon to make applicable a New Jersey statute 
making the plaintiff, if unsuccessful, liable for the expenses of the 
defense, and requiring an adequate bond as condition precedent 
to suit. Feeling that the statute was substantive to the extent of 
creating a cause of action for expenses, and that the bond was a 
reasonable enforcement thereof, the Court held the bond was a 
condition precedent to suit in the federal court. Under the pro-
posed legislation, this case will be up for re-examination on several 
grounds. First, the contra-Klaxon rule would make the New Jersey 
state statute inapplicable to this Delaware squabble. Secondly, 
federal rule 23 will control the qualifications of suit in the federal 
court on a state-given right of action. Thirdly, shareholders' deriva-
tive suits are within the tradition of federal equity and Guffey v. 
Smith161 indicates the federal equitable remedy may be available 
even if there is no state equitable remedy. 
If the state door-closing policies are to be inapplicable to the 
159 225 U.S. at 500. 
160 330 U.S. at 192. 
101 237 U.S. 101 (1915). 
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federal courts, the same must be true in the converse situation. 
When the doors of the federal court are closed to a litigant with 
a state-created right of action, whether or not the state courts are 
also closed is a matter of their own jurisdiction. Venner v. Great 
Northern Ry.162 reached the contrary result. A shareholder com-
plied with the state's requirements to sue, but the suit was removed 
to the federal court where he could not comply with the prede-
cessor of rule 23(b). Instead of remanding to the state court for 
lack of jurisdiction, the Court ordered dismissal for want of equity. 
Under the proposed legislation, this disposition must be changed, 
in order that the federal rules may be enforced as rules of proce-
dure and not of substantive law. Whenever a litigant is barred 
from the federal court because of inability to comply with federal 
requirements, the dismissal of the suit must be without prejudice 
to his right to proceed in a state court. 
3. Remedy-Denying Policies 
Once the hurdle of state door-closing policies is past, the fed-
eral judge must consider state policies denying the availability of 
particular remedies. Guffey v. Smith163 is the classic case allowing 
a remedy in federal equity where there was none available at state 
equity. Similarly, Payne v. Hook164 allowed a federal equity suit 
based on fraud because the adequate remedy at state law was not 
available at federal law: 
"We have repeatedly held 'that the jurisdiction of the courts 
of the United States over controversies between citizens of 
different States, cannot be impaired by the laws of the States, 
which prescribe the modes of redress in their courts, or which 
regulate the distribution of their judicial power.' "165 
York dismissed this "good deal of talk in the cases that federal 
equity is a separate legal system,"166 but the proposed legislation 
will restore that freedom of the federal chancellor to grant the 
necessary equitable relief. 
Under the rubric of availability of particular remedies, Bern-
102 209 U.S. 24 (1908). 
103 237 U.S. IOI (1915). 
164 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425 (1868). 
165 Id. at 430. 
1<16 326 U.S. at 105. 
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hardt v. Polygraphic Corp. of America167 is up for re-examination 
and sub-division. What was at stake in that case was a local policy 
against granting specific performance of agreements to arbitrate. 
Vermont had never applied its policy to contracts made in other 
states; the Supreme Court did it in Bernhardt. Under the proposed 
legislation, all contracts made in Vermont will be governed by that 
principle of substantive law. As to contracts governed, under con-
flicts rules, by other states' law, they should be as enforceable in the 
federal court sitting in Vermont as in any other forum in the 
world. 
As to the broader question in the Bernhardt case, whether 
Congress could constitutionally make the Federal Arbitration 
Act168 applicable to contracts involved in diversity litigation, it is 
difficult to see why not. By hypothesis, the parties have agreed 
to the arbitration clause in their contract, and the question is 
whether the court will enforce it. Whether under the rubrics of 
remedy or procedure, whether or not such specific performance 
should be available in the federal courts seems within the power 
of Congress. Closely analogous situations are the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act169 where Congress denied such a specific remedy, and the 
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act,170 where Congress granted a 
new remedy. The issue will probably ultimately turn upon the 
seventh amendment, which may or may not be read as requiring 
that agreements to arbitrate be revocable in favor of jury trial. 
The important point is that it is Congress that gives or takes away 
the remedy, not the forum state. 
4. Federal Court Procedure 
Once the federal court has accepted jurisdiction, ascertained 
the existence of a right of action under some state's substantive 
law and decided that no state or federal policies bar it from 
proceeding to entertain the right of action for a remedy, the pro-
cedure it follows is entirely federal. The object of the proposed 
legislation is to make clear that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure will govern the federal litigation, regardless of whether or 
167 350 U.S. 198 (1956). 
168 9 u.s.c. §§ 1-14 (1958). 
169 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958). 
170 48 Stat. 955 (1934), as amended by 49 Stat. 1027 (1935) [now 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201·02 
(1958)]. See Developments-Declaratory Judgments, 1941-1946, 62 HARv. L. REv. 787 (1946). 
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not a state rule of procedure would, if applied, produce a different 
result. In short, once the federal procedure is properly invoked, 
its rules-federal statutes-pre-empt the field. Ragan v. Mer-
chants Transfer & Warehouse Co.171 is immediately relevant at 
this point. The Court there held that a litigant who had com-
plied with federal rule 3172 by filing his complaint was not pro-
tected from the application of a state rule of procedure requiring 
the complaint to be served before the statute of limitations would 
be tolled. The right of action was for injuries received from a tort 
committed within the forum state, and the court of appeals had 
held that service within the period was an "integral part" of the 
state's statute of limitations. Under the proposed legislation, the 
state's statute of limitations would be substantive law binding 
upon the federal court. But the issue of whether a lawsuit has 
been instituted in a federal court is within the area of procedure 
where the federal rules hold sway. 
Perhaps clearer areas of discrimination will be those involving 
the relationship of judge and jury in the federal tribunal. Herron, 
revived by Byrd, 173 is strong doctrine that what is for the judge and 
what is for the jury is a federal matter. However, in Byrd, the 
court intimated that if the right to have the judge pass on the 
issue of immunity had been an "integral part" of the special rela-
tionship created by the statute, it might have been binding in 
the federal court. However, if that issue were presented, it is 
difficult to believe the court would not hold that the seventh 
amendment requires jury trial, or that the allocation of fact-find-
ing duties between judge and jury is a matter of federal concern, 
not state. 
It is in the area of burden of proof that perhaps the most 
difficult problems of differentiating substance from procedure will 
be presented. The Court has held, in Cities Service Oil Co. v. 
Dunlap174 and Palmer v. H offman,175 that the burden of proof is 
a matter of substantive law and that state law must be followed. 
In the former case it was stressed that the legal title-holder was 
entitled to rely upon the "substantial right" that any attacker of 
111 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
172 "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 3. 
173 See discussion accompanying notes 34-36 supra. 
174 308 U.S. 208 (1939). 
175 318 U.S. 109 (1943). 
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his title would carry the burden of proof. The latter case involved 
the burden of proving contributory negligence, and the Court 
held rule S(c) merely meant the defendant must plead it, but 
that who must prove it was controlled by state law. An earlier 
case, Stonerv. New York Life Ins. Co.,176 had held that the federal 
court should follow the state rule defining the evidence sufficient 
to raise a jury question whether the state-created right was estab-
lished. It has been suggested 177 that this means only that what 
elements must be proved to make out a cause of action is a matter 
of state substantive law, but the amount of evidence necessary 
for the direction of a verdict one way or the other would be a 
matter for the forum. Some state rules of evidence, like that in 
Cities Service, really are rules of substantive law, and do affect 
"prelitigation conduct." Others are mere procedural matters for 
expediting trial and getting at the facts. The federal court, in this 
as in all other matters, must be free to sift the substance from the 
shadow, case by case.178 
176 311 U.S. 464 (1940). 
177 Note, State Trial Procedure and the Federal Courts: Evidence, Juries and 
Directed Verdicts Under the Erie Doctrine, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1516 (1953). 
178 See Holtzoff, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins, 24 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 57 (1940); Symposium-Federal Trials and the Erie Doctrine, 
51 Nw. U.L. REv. 338 (1956); Note, The Erie Case and the Federal Rules-A Prediction, 
39 GEo. L.J. 600 (1951); Note, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 62 HARV. 
L. REv. 1030 (1949). 
